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Problems at Daubert: Expert Testimony in
Title VII Sex Discrimination and Sexual
Harassment Litigation
HARRIET M. ANTCZAKt
INTRODUCTION
When Ann Hopkins was denied partnership at the
accounting firm where she held a position as a senior
manager, she was told that she should "take a course at
charm school," and "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry." Hopkins brought a sex
discrimination suit, and presented expert testimony by a
national expert on sex stereotyping.2 The case reached the
United States Supreme Court, which ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to find that sex stereotyping had affected
her evaluation for partnership. However, the Court noted
that the expert testimony was just "icing on [the] cake"
because it did not take special training to identify the sex
stereotyping present in comments made by Hopkins'
supervisors.
The Court's reasoning is exemplary of a larger problem
present in today's sex discrimination and sexual
t Affiliated Attorney at Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
J.D., Columbia Law School 2010, B.A., Cornell University 2005. I would like to
extend heartfelt gratitude to Elizabeth Schneider, Rose L. Hoffer Professor of
Law at Brooklyn Law School, and Susan P. Sturm, George M. Jaffin Professor of
Law and Social Responsibility at Columbia Law School for their support,
guidance and mentorship throughout the writing of this piece.
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (quoting Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072, as
recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
2. Id. at 255 ("In finding that some of the partners' comments
reflected sex stereotyping, the District Court relied in part on Dr.
Fiske's expert testimony.").
3. Id. at 256.
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harassment cases. Some judges may be inclined to deny the
admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702
because they find it to be not helpful to the trier of fact. The
conclusion that it is not helpful demonstrates an
assumption by courts that fact-finders are already equipped
to decide sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases,
without the benefit of expert testimony. However, fact-
finders do not necessarily have the social science context
needed to decide such cases without the aid of expert
testimony. The educational role that experts play not only
provides a framework for a plaintiffs claim, but can actually
correct misconceptions about sex discrimination and sexual
harassment.4
Thus, while expert testimony can be excluded for many
reasons, the most problematic is that judges may assume
that they or the jury already have the most accurate and
informed understanding of how sex discrimination or sexual
harassment occurs. Judges then exclude expert testimony
for lack of relevance or failing to assist the trier of fact. The
exclusion of such testimony prevents fact-finders from
receiving important information that they may need to hear
in order to accurately understand the ways that sex
discrimination and sexual harassment actually operate.
One of the consequences of exclusion is an increased
chance of summary judgment against plaintiffs, resulting in
the dismissal of claims that may in fact be meritorious.'
Claims are dismissed because without expert testimony, the
plaintiffs claim may be unable to go forward.6 In addition,
4. See Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is the Common Knowledge?
Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment
Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999) ("Expert testimony is so useful for
correcting the substantial misperceptions and biases [among fact-finders that it]
should be regarded as necessary for the just adjudication of sexual harassment
claims.").
5. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender
and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERs L. REV. 705, 723-24 (2007) (discussing
increased use of summary judgment at Daubert stage of litigation).
6. See id. at 753-54 (discussing the importance of expert testimony in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment cases); see also Dianne Avery, The Great
American Makeover: The Sexing Up and Dumbing Down of Women's Work After
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 322
(2007) ("Under the Ninth Circuit's sex stereotyping framework in Jespersen,
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by excluding expert testimony, courts not only prevent fact-
finders from hearing testimony that can correct inaccurate
assumptions about sex stereotyping, but also stifle
jurisprudence in the areas of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment, allowing the law to fall behind social science.
Fact-finders cannot make truly informed or accurate
decisions unless they are exposed to expert testimony that
educates them as to the ways that sex discrimination and
sexual harassment operate in the workplace. Therefore,
courts need to take a more holistic approach to the
admissibility of expert testimony in Title VII cases,
examining the relevance of the evidence under a broader
standard. Expert testimony can and should be allowed to
provide the fact-finder with explanations of the mechanisms
of sex discrimination, sex stereotyping, and sexual
harassment.
Part I of this article presents the problems created by
the belief that certain expert testimony is not helpful or
relevant: when judges exclude expert testimony in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment cases, they may
reach inaccurate conclusions about a plaintiffs claim that
can lead to dismissal of a case, particularly at the stage of
summary judgment. In addition, exclusion of expert
testimony prevents fact-finders and judges from being
educated as to the ways that sex discrimination and
harassment operate, and impedes the development of
jurisprudence in Title VII cases.
Part II provides an analysis of how decisions to exclude
expert testimony under the test established in Daubert fail
to understand or take account of the substance of experts'
theories, resulting in the misapplication of standards and
the perpetuation of jurisprudence that does not keep up
with current social science. Daubert evaluations lead to the
exclusion of expert testimony under analyses of lack of
relevance and helpfulness.
Part III suggests that judges should evaluate the
testimony with a view to a broader, more holistic picture,
plaintiffs challenging an employer's sex-based dress or grooming policy ... may
have to rely on social science evidence and expert testimony in order to establish
an unlawful sex-based motive for the policy.").
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keeping in mind that what they believe to be true is not
necessarily informed by current social science research;
thus,' fact-finders need to hear expert testimony in order to
make accurate determinations. It demonstrates that this
approach would allow courts to bring science into the
courtroom in a way that presents informed and accepted
social science theories to explain sex discrimination, sex
stereotyping, and sexual harassment.
I. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY CAN LEAD TO
UNWARRANTED DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS
If fact-finders do not hear expert testimony, they may
make ill-informed decisions that can lead to the dismissal of
meritorious claims, particularly through an increase in the
use of summary judgment-a larger phenomenon that has
long plagued claims involving gender.' In addition, the
consequences of excluding expert testimony include
preventing the education of the trier of fact and limiting
jurisprudential advancement.
A. Expert Testimony Aids Fact-Finders in Understanding
Social Science and Correctly Applying Legal Standards
1. Sex Discrimination in the Workplace. Social science
research shows how sex discrimination functions in ways
that were not previously recognized or that have not been as
noticeable compared to overt discrimination based on
animus. In sex discrimination litigation, expert testimony
is based on social science research on cognitive bias' and
social frameworks.
7. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 745-49 (describing history of summary
judgment with respect to gender cases).
8. See, e.g., William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using
Expert Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 377, 383 (2003) [hereinafter Bielby, Can I Get a
Witness?] (discussing value of social science in expert testimony on gender bias
and stereotypes). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and
Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006) (discussing ideas of
behavioral theories and bias in employment discrimination).
9. See Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, Essay, A Matter of Context: Social
Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM
Vol. XIX36
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Experts in sex discrimination cases testify that social
science research helps to explain what kinds of decisions
might be subject to stereotyping influences, and also how
the case at hand includes decisions that were biased, to a
degree of reasonable certainty.'o Experts testifying on
behalf of a defendant can also testify that decisions were not
the result of bias, and that the methodology used by a
plaintiffs expert was unsound." There is not clear
agreement about whether experts should necessarily be able
to testify that a particular decision constituted
discrimination,12 but there is wide support for expert
testimony on general social science theory to provide context
for decisions or behaviors involving issues related to
gender."
The context is found in recent social science that has
developed around the recognition of gender bias as "neither
self-conscious nor aversive," and which can thus be of use in
proving a case of sex discrimination. 4 This research needs
to be presented to the fact-finder, as it can help plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases present sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that discrimination did occur.
For instance, it can be used to explain effects of workplace
decisions and dynamics on women 6 and how discrimination
L. REV. 37, 44 (2009) ("Social framework expert testimony essentially uses
general social science research to help explain why the law should be applied in
a particular way to the facts of a particular case.").
10. See Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?, supra note 8, at 386 (discussing ways
social science experts are proffered by plaintiffs).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta, & Cecilia L. Ridgeway,
A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1394 (2008) (arguing that experts should be able to testify
as to general theory, but not to whether or not implicit bias contributed to
particular employment decisions).
13. See id.; see generally Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? supra note 8.
14. Joan C. Williams, Introduction, 7 EMP.RTs & EMP. POL'Y J. 287, 294
(2003) (discussing idea of subtle bias in gender cases).
15. See Hart & Secunda, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing how testimony on
stereotyping can aid in cases challenging workplace discrimination).
16. See generally Williams, supra note 14 (discussing how bias affects
women's opportunities in the workplace).
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does not necessarily involve animus or intent. 7 It can also
be used to explain the concept of implicit bias in a general
way, so that fact-finders can then determine "whether a
particular employment decision was a product of improper
motives.""
The importance of this testimony, in addition to
supporting plaintiffs' individual cases, is that it updates the
social science relied on by courts in discrimination
litigation-social science that is not necessarily common
knowledge for lay juries. While social science theories once
assumed that discrimination was intentional, these updated
theories can explain to a judge or jury how "unspoken
associations or 'implicit expectancies'". can skew the way an
individual receives information-thus interpreting identical
behavior from a man and woman differently. 9 In fact, while
a "commonsense understanding" of human behavior may
assume that people are aware of their motivations and
report them willingly, research shows that these
assumptions are grossly inaccurate.20
2. Sexual Harassment. In sexual harassment cases,
expert testimony is based on social science research around
what is generally perceived as harassment,2' the effects of
17. See Susan T. Fiske, Panel Two: Stereotypes in the Litigation of Work/Life
Conflict, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 47, 47-48 (2006) (describing role as "educating
the triers of fact" that discrimination is not about animus or intent, but that
people have "immediate stereotypic associations.").
18. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1394 (arguing that courts should admit
expert testimony on implicit bias to aid triers of fact in understanding the social
science before determining a case on the merits).
19. See Williams, supra note 14, at 294 (discussing how unexamined
stereotypes may contribute to the perception that a man is a "go getter" but a
woman is "too aggressive").
20. See Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1404-28 (discussing research on
stereotyping and reporting); see also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 94 (2003) (arguing that Title VII is not
well equipped to address subtle forms of discrimination because of the
prevailing conceptions of discrimination found in the legal doctrine).
21. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between
What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L.
REv. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Beiner, Let the Jury Decide] (discussing perceptions
of sexual harassment).
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harassment,22 cultural differences, 23  and issues such as
failure to report and other responses to harassment.24 For
instance, men may be less likely than women to view
certain actions as sexual harassment.25
Expert testimony helps to educate fact-finders about
sexual harassment by explaining causes, consequences,
incidence, and other aspects of harassment.26 It can thus
help to provide a basis for better-informed decisions, as fact-
finders will understand relevant issues such as the
hesitance to report, and what can constitute harassment.27
22. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of
Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578 (1997) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Antecedents].
23. See generally Jennifer Zimbroff, Note, Cultural Differences in Perceptions
of and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1311
(2007) (exploring differences among cultures in sexual harassment).
24. See generally, Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why
Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of
Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, J. Soc. IssuEs, Spring 1995, at 117
[hereinafter Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him?] (discussing
social science data behind failure to report); L. Camille H6bert, Why Don't
"Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711
(2007) (arguing for a "reasonable women" standard with respect to failure to
report); Margaret E. Johnson, "Avoiding Harm Otherwise": Reframing Women
Employees' Reponses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 TEMP. L. REV.
743 (2007) (advocating an approach to evaluating women's reactions that takes
into account the agency in responses other than formal reporting).
25. See Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 372 (discussing study finding that men
were less likely than women to see certain actions such as sexual looks or sexual
comments as sexual harassment).
26. See, e.g., Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 794 ("Social
science informs us about behaviors that men and women might perceive as
harassing."); see also Fitzgerald, Antecedents, supra note 22, at 578 (providing a
social science analysis of sexual harassment in organizations); Louise F.
Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV..,152 (1988) (providing a
social science analysis of the effect sexual harassment in the workplace has on
women).;
27. Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 372 ("[Expert] testimony likely helped to
narrow the gender gap that partially accounts for the absence of a true common
knowledge about sexual harassment."); see also id. at 357 ("[Elxperts educate
triers of fact as to reasonable responses to harassment, and ultimately, as to
whether the alleged misconduct at issue constitutes harassment."); Zimbroff,
supra note 23, at 1337 ( "Clearly expert testimony and the social psychology
392011
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Even if there is some agreement about what constitutes
sexual harassment,28 experts are needed,29 particularly to
demonstrate the mechanisms that produce harassment in
the workplace.
B. How Expert Testimony is Evaluated: Daubert and Rule
702
As above, the admissibility of social science testimony in
Title VII cases can have far-reaching consequences. Thus,
it is important to examine the legal standards by which
judges evaluate expert testimony in deciding upon its
admissibility. These standards govern what social science
is permitted into the courtroom and what is excluded.
1. Before Daubert. Until 1993, Frye v. United States"o
governed the admissibility of expert testimony with a
"general acceptance" test. In order to be admissible, expert
testimony had to come from well-recognized scientific
principles and methods "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.""
The goal of the test formulated in Frye was to screen
expert testimony so that the jury would not be exposed to
"junk science."32 However, it often kept out valid scientific
research have a role in correcting biases and misperceptions of judges and
juries, in educating judges and juries about patterns and perceptions of sexual
harassment and hesitance to report, as well as in accepting that different
groups and individuals may possess genuinely differing belief systems about
what constitutes harassment.").
28. See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 842 ("[Slocial science
data . . . show[s] a high degree of agreement about certain behaviors
constituting harassment.").
29. See id. at 795 ("[Clourts have not evaluated sexual harassment cases in a
manner consistent with what many reasonable people believe is harassing.").
30. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
31. Id. at 1014.
32. Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment:
Reconciling Celotex and Daubert After Kochert, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307, 312
(2008) (discussing how Frye's general acceptance standard sought to conserve
judicial resources by preventing pseudoscience from reaching juries).
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testimony that was simply not deemed to be at general
acceptance level."
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted.34
Rule 702 offered a different standard for admissibility of
expert testimony: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."
2. The Daubert Decision. The two standards coexisted
for a number of years. But in 1993, noting the "sharp
division among the courts regarding the proper standard for
the admission of expert testimony," the Supreme Court, in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3 held that
the Frye test was superseded by Rule 702.37 Thus expert
testimony had to be reliable,38 relevant,"3 and helpful40 to the
trier of fact.
When examining the relevance inquiry, the Court
looked to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 40241-sections
33. See id. at 313 (noting application of Frye "delayed valid science from
reaching the courtroom.").
34. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE v-vi (3d ed. 2010)
(describing drafting and enactment process of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
35. FED. R. EVID. 702.
36. 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
37. See id. at 587.
38. For assessing reliability, the Court laid out several factors that judges
should consider in their analyses: whether a theory or technique had been
tested; whether it had been subjected to peer review and publication; the
potential rate of error; and whether the theory or technique is generally
accepted. Id. at 593-94.
39. Id. at 597 (holding Federal Rules of Evidence "assign to the trial judge
the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand").
40. Id. at 591.
41. Rule 401 is the definition of "relevant evidence," explained as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
2011 41
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relating to relevance of evidence-noting that based on
those two Rules, the "basic standard of relevance thus is a
liberal one."42 The Court discussed this prong of the
analysis with reference to specific language from Rule 702-
that the testimony must "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,"4
noting that it is a requirement that "goes primarily to
relevance.""
The Court additionally characterized the analysis as a
consideration of "fit" and "helpfulness."45 Thus, the
requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact" is a
basic inquiry into relevance, as stated by the Court early in
its opinion.
Overall, the Court positioned the trial judge as a
gatekeeper.47 The trial judge need not determine if the
testimony is correct, but simply whether it is based on
reliable methodologies. 4 8 The Court noted that inquiry was
to be a flexible one. 9
Two more cases impacted how the Daubert test is
applied. General Electric v. Joiner" defined the standard
for review of evaluations made under Daubert-that
decisions will not be overturned unless "manifestly
erroneous."5 1 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael52 extended the
without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401. Rule 402 provides that "[elvidence
which is not relevant is not admissible." FED R. EVID. 402.
42. 509 U.S. at 587.
43. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 591-92.
46. Id. at 591.
47. Id. at 597 (noting gate-keeping role of judge may keep out some authentic
evidence but such balancing is appropriate for legal disputes).
48. Id. at 592-93.
49. Id. at 594.
50. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
51. Id. at 142; see also Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the
Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 293 (2007) (discussing effect of
Joiner). Some scholars have criticized the Court's conferral of such tremendous
power to district court judges as a means of giving the judges authority to avoid
Vol. XIX42
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trial judge's role as gatekeeper to all types of expert
testimony." This was an explicit recognition that expertise
such as social science testimony was subject to a Daubert
inquiry. While courts had certainly admitted expert
testimony in sex discrimination and sexual harassment
cases prior to this case,54 Kumho Tire laid out the direct
requirement that the standards of Daubert should be
applied by trial judges to social science testimony.
In 2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to
incorporate the Court's decisions." The new Rule requires
that "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.""
trying cases on the merits. Id. ("Ultimately, if a district court judge does not
want to try a case, he or she can find a way to avoid doing so.").
52. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
53. Id. at 141 ("We conclude that Daubert's general holding-setting forth the
trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony
based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and
'other specialized' knowledge.") (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
54. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse).
Many courts cite Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., a 1996 Seventh Circuit decision,
for the proposition that Daubert applies to the social sciences. See, e.g.,
Sundstrom v. Frank, 630 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2007) ("The Daubert
framework is applicable to social science experts, as well as to experts in the
hard sciences." (quoting Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th
Cir. 1996))). Tyus was a housing discrimination case where an expert was
proffered to testify as to the effects of advertising. 102 F.3d at 262. In finding
error in the district court's decision to exclude the expert testimony, the court
observed that, "[wie have noted a number of times since the Supreme Court
decided Daubert that its framework for assessing expert testimony is applicable
to social science experts, just as it applies to experts in the hard sciences." Id. at
263. While not gender-related, this case demonstrates that before Kumho Tire,
courts were open to the idea of applying Daubert to social science generally, and,
as demonstrated by Price Waterhouse, courts were willing to hear expert
testimony on gender.
55. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 34, at 450-51 (discussing amendment of Rule
702 in response to Daubert and to the many cases applying Daubert, including
Kumho Tire).
56. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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3. "Liberalizing." The Daubert decision was intended to
liberalize the admission of expert testimony," but many
scholars agree that it did not do so." Rather, it may have
actually tightened standards as well as made review of
decisions to exclude testimony more difficult to challenge.
Thus, courts may be employing the Daubert standard in
ways that keep testimony and even cases from a jury."
Such an application of Daubert prevents plaintiffs from
using expert testimony to supgort claims that can have far-
reaching public consequences.
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588; see also
Kanner & Casey, supra note 51, at 322. ("One of the reasons for Daubert was to
allow for a more liberal standard in novel cases."); Anthony Z. Roisman,
Embrace Tiger-Return to Mountain: Taming the Daubert Tiger, SN082 ALI-
ABA 139 (2008) ("The underlying goal of [Daubert] was to continue to liberalize
the process for admissibility of scientific testimony. . . .").
58. See, e.g., Razavi, supra note 32, at 318 ("[1It is still difficult to argue
categorically whether the new standard is actually more or less stringent than
the Frye general acceptance standard."); Kanner & Casey, supra note 51, at 283
("[Daubert was mleant to liberalize the admittance of scientific evidence, [but]
the actual result has been the exact opposite."). This is not necessarily a matter
for concern; in fact, some think that Daubert has been helpful in keeping faulty
expert testimony out of courts and may even have not done enough to improve
the science reaching juries. See Stephen D. Easton, That Is Not All There Is:
Enhancing Daubert Exclusion by Applying "Ordinary" Witness Principles to
Experts, 84 NEB. L. REV. 675, 679 (2006) ("Daubert gatekeeping, while helpful in
excluding some faulty expert testimony, has not eliminated all such expert
testimony from civil trials."); see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap:
Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science Evidence in Criminal Cases,
24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41, 41 (2001) (asserting "basic bias" in
application of rules of evidence where due to "flexible" Daubert inquiry, courts
admit evidence regarding Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma
Syndrome despite the fact that neither meet requirements for admissibility
under Daubert).
59. Kanner & Casey, supra note 51, at 299-308 (discussing factors that
contribute to reduced jury trials). It could also be argued, however, that judges
are not effective gatekeepers at all. See Margaret Bull Kovera, Melissa B.
Russano & Bradley D. McAuliff, Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology
Underlying Daubert: Legal Decision Makers' Abilities to Evaluate Expert
Evidence in Hostile Work Environment Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 180,
196 (2002) ( "[J]udges may not recognize flawed research when they confront it
and they may indeed admit invalid research into evidence.") (citation omitted).
60. See Kanner & Casey, supra note 51, at 315 ("So Daubert, a decision which
was to make novel claims easier, has more than doubled the amount of doors
Vol. XIX44
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C. Consequences of Exclusion
Excluding expert testimony through a Daubert
evaluation prevents that testimony from reaching the fact-
finder, which can have several consequences: it increases
the chances of summary judgment for defendants, prevents
judges and juries from being educated by experts as to how
sex discrimination or sexual harassment operate or
manifest, and hinders the development of legal theories of
discrimination and harassment under Title VII.
First, if a plaintiffs proffered testimony is excluded, a
grant of summary judgment is much more likely for the
defendant.6 1 Scientific expert testimony is becoming
increasingly common in all types of litigation, including
women's rights and employment cases.62 Indeed, some cases
simply cannot go forward without it."3 In these cases, if a
party's expert testimony is deemed inadmissible, the suit
may essentially be over.' To survive summary judgment,
the case must present a disputed issue of fact. Therefore, if
the testimony that would bring a plaintiffs main factual
evidence to light is excluded, the claim is unsupported and
will be dismissed.
Therefore, as a general matter, summary judgment may
raise serious concerns about access to juries,6 5 and it may
slammed to [plaintiffs].... Daubert has severely crippled the plaintiffs right to
a jury trial and has had an effect opposite of that which the Supreme Court
intended.").
61. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 754; see also Beiner, Let the Jury Decide,
supra note 21, at 821 ("Hopefully, social science data on what people believe is
harassing will prevent judges from rushing to judgment in these cases, but
instead convince them that the issue might well be one for the jury.").
62. Schneider, supra note 5, at 753.
63. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert
Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1363 (1994) ("In many sorts of civil litigation, the
plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of proof without scientific evidence.").
64. See Edward K. Cheng and Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter?
A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005)
(noting improved chances of obtaining summary judgment by defendants if
certain scientific evidence excluded).
65. The concern about taking cases away from juries includes the idea that
the reduced likelihood of a case going to trial may reduce incentives for
defendants to engage in corrective behavior. See Kanner & Casey, supra note
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have a more harmful effect on certain types of plaintiffs. In
the employment discrimination context, for example,
empirical data shows that summary judgment is more often
granted against plaintiffs when the plaintiff is a woman. "
The exclusion of expert testimony, making a grant of
summary judgment more likely for defendants," thus has
important consequences for particular plaintiffs but broader
consequences as well: claims that carry heavy social
implications may never reach the courtroom.
Second, exclusion of expert testimony prevents judges
and juries from hearing evidence that is both relevant to the
outcome of the case and that educates them as to the ways
in which discrimination and stereotyping function. 6 Older
and inaccurate science will remain in the law, misinforming
legal reasoning. For instance, the "commonsense"
understanding of human behavior is that people have
accurate knowledge of their internal thoughts and
motivations and that they are willing to state them
honestly. However, both have been proven to not
necessarily be the case.69
Thirdly, the testimony itself is necessary to promote
progress in legal theories of discrimination70 and to educate
51, at 315 (discussing chilling effect on plaintiffs and ramifications of fewer jury
trials).
66. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 710 (discussing conclusions of Task Force
Reports finding summary judgment more likely to be granted in certain cases).
Schneider identifies aspects of summary judgment decision-making that bear on
Daubert analyses, such as female plaintiff credibility and the determination of
what a "reasonable juror" might find. Id. at 711.
67. Id. at 724-25 (discussing wide impact of Daubert at the summary
judgment stage).
68. See Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs.
Feminist Reforms, 19 HARY. WOMEN's L.J. 127, 142 (1996) ("[Expert testimony]
has a significant educative role in placing before the jury the results of
'empirical investigations that took women's experiences seriously' and, hence, in
expanding understandings of 'normal' human behavior.") (footnote omitted).
69. See Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1429 (comparing current legal
theories of brain function as resembling "the science of the eighteenth century").
70. See William T. Bielby & Pamela Coukos, "Statistical Dueling" with
Unconventional Weapons: What Courts Should Know About Experts in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 56 EMoRY L.J. 1563, 1582-83 (2007)
[hereinafter Bielby & Coukos, Statistical Dueling] (discussing how legal
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the trier of fact. The concept of "fit" is a question of
relevance that ensures the "proffered expertise is valid for
purposes made salient by applicable law."71 Exclusion of
testimony can stunt the development of theories of recovery,
because social science can be useful not just in providing
evidentiary bases in specific cases, but in informing larger
questions in discrimination law in general. 72  Disregarding
testimony as irrelevant maintains the status quo of
discrimination theories in the courtroom-ones based on
outdated social science theory.73 The exclusion of expert
testimony by courts also means that judges are determining
the prevailing scope of actionable stereotyping and
discrimination, 4 perhaps based on faulty assumptions.
Both the perspectives of judges themselves and the
parallel doctrinal limitations may contribute to the failure
scholarship recognizes the disconnect between much of legal discrimination
doctrine and the current problems in discrimination and that new legal theories
must be developed to address this gap).
71. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1390.
72. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and
Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 492 (2007) (discussing
importance of using implicit bias to understand "both the need for and the limits
of antidiscrimination law" and also calling for more scholars to address the
normative aspects of reform theories); see also Faigman et al., supra note 12, at
1399 (discussing implications of implicit motivating factors for Title VII
jurisprudence); Green, supra note 20, at 112 (pointing out concerns that current
legal doctrine is inadequate without a fuller conception of discrimination).
73. See Bagenstos, supra note 72, at 483-91 (discussing varying perceptions of
antidiscrimination law and the necessary view of social science testimony that
follows from those perceptions); see also Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the
Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 642-43 (1998) ("Legal doctrine reflects many
outmoded assumptions about both the dynamics of discrimination and the
structure of decision making that were in place at the inception of the civil
rights regime.").
74. See Renbe Romkens, Ambiguous Responsibilities: Law and Conflicting
Expert Testimony on the Abused Woman Who Shot Her Sleeping Husband, 25
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 355, 355 (2000) ("Various aspects of expert testimony,
unrelated to the scientific validity of the knowledge, profoundly influence how
specialized knowledge from experts will or will not be validated by the law.")
Roemkins also notes that the law can "mask[]... its gender bias in the process of
inclusion or exclusion of expert knowledge." Id. at 356.
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of plaintiffs' claims." Instead, interpretations of Title VII
should "track current knowledge about human cognition
based on the mind sciences."" For instance, with respect to
Title VII, Congress did not specify whether the employer's
motivating factors must be explicitly intentional in order to
prove a claim." If they must be explicit, then social science
around implicit bias would not be relevant and judges would
properly exclude it, but the law and science point to the
opposite conclusion." Judges should be admitting expert
testimony to explain how motivating factors can have
implicit components that affect decision-making.
Excluding expert testimony can thus negatively
influence the development of theories not only of recovery
but also of the validity of social science in general."
Knowledge that seems to present a challenge to traditional
ways of thinking may be brushed off as invalid,"
particularly when applied to a legal context. The power of
law here lies in its ability to "include certain knowledge as
valid, and exclude other knowledge as marginal, irrelevant,
or invalid."
Because of the power law has to include or exclude
social science, the standard by which social science
testimony is evaluated proves to be a critical one. Thus,
Daubert evaluations can present a tipping point for the
strength and viability of Title VII claims.
75. See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex
Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2009) (discussing research showing
lack of success of plaintiffs at summary judgment and at trial can be attributed
to "negative judicial attitudes and doctrinal limitations.").
76. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1428 (discussing scientific "fit" of
implicit bias literature in the courtroom).
77. Id. at 1433.
78. Id.
79. See Romkens, supra note 74, at 355-56.
80. Id. at 359 ("This is particularly the case for feminist or critical race-based
knowledge that fundamentally contests a gender-based asymmetry or, more
generally, knowledge that validates women's experiences in ways contrary to
the dominant legal doctrine").
81. Id. (emphasis added); see also Faigman et al., supra note 11, at 1428 ( "[Ihf
applicable law does not recognize implicit motivating factors as relevant in the
first place, [implicit bias] literature is rendered immaterial at the start.").
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II. PROBLEMS AT DAUBERT: How DAUBERT EVALUATIONS
ARE MISUSED TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY
The consequences of exclusion of expert testimony noted
above are the result of a lack of understanding or narrow
interpretation on the part of courts applying Daubert to
social science testimony in Title VII cases. Judges' views on
the substance of the testimony interact with the procedural
component of Daubert, leading to formulations of the law
that may omit critical social science theory, thus
undermining the accuracy of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment claims dispositions and setting ill-informed
precedent. This Part describes the substance of different
aspects of social science testimony and how, through narrow
application of Daubert principles, such testimony is
excluded.
A. Expertise in the Courtroom
Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII governs
sex discrimination and sexual harassment suits and makes
it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of sex.82 Claims relating to both
employment discrimination and sexual harassment in the
workplace fall under this provision, under theories of
disparate impact, disparate treatment, hostile work
environment, and quid pro quo sexual harassment."
1. Sex Discrimination Expertise. Employment
discrimination operates in more ways than simply overt and
intentional animus.84 While theories once assumed that
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
83. See generally Thomas Fusco, Annotation, What Constitutes Sex
Discrimination in Termination of Employee so as to Violate Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. 0 2000e et seq.), 115 A.L.R. FED. 1
(discussing claims of sex discrimination).
84. See Robin Stryker, Disparate Impact and the Quota Debates: Law, Labor
Market Sociology, and Equal Employment Policies, 42 Soc. Q. 13, 15 (2001)
[hereinafter Stryker, Disparate Impact] ("Institutionalized practices often
perpetuate discriminatory patterns established in the past even when race or
gender animus is absent.") (citation omitted). See generally Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) [hereinafter, Sturm, Second Generation] (discussing
how "second generation" discrimination is more likely the result of unconscious
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discrimination was intentional, newer studies point to how
"unspoken associations or 'implicit expectancies"'. can skew
the way an individual receives information-thus
interpreting identical behavior from a man and woman
differently."
However, theories about human behavior and
psychology within antidiscrimination law have fallen far
behind social science.86 Social psychology "is already there"
in the courts; antidiscrimination doctrine inevitably
includes applying understandings of social context." Thus,
while judges may assert that no social science is necessary,
they are in fact already implicitly using it, sometimes
making incorrect assumptions. 8 And unfortunately, "[o]nce
a particular model of human behavior becomes embedded in
legal doctrine, judges may go to great lengths to avoid
having to modify it."" When using any kind of psychological
theories in their own legal analysis, "Uudges] should take
biases that are systemic and structural, rather than intentional and
individualized);
85. See Williams, supra note 14, at 291 (discussing how unexamined
stereotypes may contribute to perception that a man is a "go getter" but a
woman is "too aggressive").
86. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 8, at 1026 ("[C]urrent judicial models of what
discrimination is, what causes it to occur, and how one should go about
determining whether it happened in any given case, now diverge in significant
ways from the models of intergroup bias validated through empirical inquiry in
the social sciences.").
87. Id. at 1006 (noting judges constantly employ "intuitive" or "common
sense" psychological theories).
88. Id. at 1003-04 ("[Legal] scholarship chronicles the many ways in which
established civil rights jurisprudence is premised on models of social perception
and judgment that have been significantly discredited by empirical work in
social and cognitive psychology.").
89. Id. at 1025. The push for more diversity on the bench may also play an
issue in the relevance of expert testimony; female judges could bring "a unique
set of moral and relational attributes" to a legal structure that is based on
traditionally masculine values. Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the
Court of Appeals Revisited: The Data Since 1994, 92 GEo. L.J. 689, 691 (2004)
(discussing contribution of social science to feminist decisionmaking theory); see
also Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe, 42
WILLAMErrE L. REV. 1, 13 (2006) (discussing identification of bias in decision-
making by judges).
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reasonable steps to ensure that those theories are valid.""
The exclusion of more recent science means that the law
falls behind our current understanding of sex
discrimination.
Experts can remedy this knowledge gap by testifying
about sex stereotyping in workplace sex discrimination
cases." They can testify as to how social science research
helps to explain what kinds of decisions may be subject to
stereotyping influences92 and that the case at hand includes
decisions that were biased, to a degree of reasonable
certainty." Additionally, experts can explain how certain
systematic practices negatively impact women.94
It should be noted that the "social framework""
testimony that provides a basis for some of these theories,
while endorsed by many scholars,96 has not gained full
acceptance for its utility.97 However, it may be that the
90. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 8, at 1006.
91. See, e.g., Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?, supra note 8, at 383 (discussing
value of social science in expert testimony on gender bias and stereotypes).
92. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 72 (criticizing Mitchell & Tetlock's
arguments and arguing for a normative case for responding to implicit bias);
Hart & Secunda, supra note 9 (discussing how social framework testimony is
used and its value); John Monahan, Laurens Walker, Gregory Mitchell,
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social
Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REV. 1715 (2008) (describing but positing limits on social
framework testimony); Williams, supra note 14 (discussing idea of subtle bias in
gender cases).
93. See Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?, supra note 8, at 386 (discussing ways
social science experts are proffered by plaintiffs).
94. See Stryker, Disparate Impact, supra note 84, at 36 (noting that under
disparate impact theory sociologists have a place to contribute to Title VII
enforcement).
95. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) (defining social
frameworks as "the use of social science in law" in order to "construct a frame of
reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the
resolution of a specific case").
96. See generally Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?, supra note 8; Hart & Secunda,
supra note 9.
97. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1431-32 (arguing that experts
testifying about social framework theories should not be allowed to state
whether a specific employment decision was motivated by implicit bias);
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disagreement is more centered on "normative assumptions
about what kinds of discrimination the law should seek to
prevent and punish,"" rather than on what the science
shows. A determination of what the law should punish is
one that both the judiciary and legislatures are equipped to
answer, but knowledge of that science is necessary before
any such evaluation can take place.
Despite the disagreement that remains over the social
science, courts have already engaged this testimony.99
Experts have been accepted to testify about sex stereotyping
in employment discrimination cases. In one case, for
instance, the plaintiff offered expert testimony on theories
and research on gender stereotyping where the expert
"opine[d] based on Plaintiffs perceptions and certain other
aspects of the record in this case that Plaintiffs work
assignments and termination were the product of such
stereotyping."' 0 In another, Butler v. Home Depot, the court
allowed an expert to testify as to how gender stereotyping is
"automatic and not fully conscious at the individual level.""0 '
Statistical evidence can also be employed to show
whether or not a male-dominated work environment exists.
For example, in EEOC v. Morgan Stanley,102 the plaintiffs
introduced testimony by social scientist William T. Bielby
on workplace gender bias. Dr. Bielby applied social science
research to the case at hand and found that a male-
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) (arguing that implicit bias research
does not currently "satisfy key scientific tests of validity"); Monahan et al.,
supra note 92, at 1719 (arguing that courts must put limits on the conclusions
that can be drawn from social framework testimony).
98. Bagenstos, supra note 72, at 479-80 (analyzing the disagreement
surrounding the use of implicit bias research).
99. For a detailed discussion of the testimony of experts Bielby, Fiske, and
Harris concerning implicit bias and stereotyping theory in various court cases,
see Mark S. Dichter, Gender Discrimination Claims, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 2005, at 335, 356-66 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 6117, 2005).
100. Int'l Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp.
2d 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y 2007).
101. 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
102. 324 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
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dominated work environment existed. 0 3  The court
ultimately admitted Dr. Bielby's testimony as to part of his
proffered opinions-those relating to gender stereotypes,
but not those regarding any deficiencies in workplace policy
as evidence of discrimination."
2. Sexual Harassment Expertise. Expert testimony is
equally relevant and useful in sexual harassment litigation.
There are two ways of making out a claim for sexual
harassment: quid pro quo" or hostile work environment.'06
Experts can offer testimony on a number of different aspects
of a sexual harassment claim,' and the testimony can be
103. Id. at 460. This case was a class action sex discrimination suit where Dr.
Bielby was proffered to testify as to social science research on factors that create
workplace bias, how gender stereotypes affect personnel decisions, and policies
that act as barriers to the advancement of women or that can reduce gender
bias. Id. at 460-62.
104. Id. at 462. Evidence has, in some cases, also been accepted to educate the
fact-finder as to human resources policies and practices. In Humphreys v.
Regents of the University of California, , a gender discrimination case, the court
found that such testimony was relevant because it related to the plaintiffs
argument refuting the pretext for being laid off, and also because the jury was
unlikely to be familiar with human resources practices and policies. No. C04-
03808, 2006 WL 1867713, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2006).
105. A quid pro quo claim requires an allegation that a supervisor took a
tangible employment action against the employee plaintiff for refusing to accede
to demands for sexual favors. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 797.
106. A hostile work environment claim generally requires
1) that the employee was subjected unwelcome harassment; 2) the harassment
was based on his or her gender; 3) that it was "sufficiently severe or pervasive"
to alter a term, condition, or privilege of employment; 4) that in the case of co-
worker harassment, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective action, but that in
the case of supervisor harassment, the employer is strictly liable, subject to the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.
See id. at 796-97; see note 210 infra, and accompanying text..
107. See, e.g., Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:04-CV-6059-SMS,
2007 WL 715526, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (discussing but excluding
expert testimony on the effectiveness of a workplace's anti-discrimination
procedures); EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 99 C 3356(WKU), 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS
17543, at *4-5, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002) (discussing but rejecting expert
testimony based on the social science tool of a Sexualized Experience
Questionnaire)..
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used in determining a standard for imputing liability to
employers.'o
Expert testimony can aid in determining what
constitutes sexual harassment.' For instance, under a
hostile work environment claim, social science is useful in
determining what kind of harassment meets the
"sufficiently severe" standard required under the law."0
Testimony can also present social science research
regarding what is "reasonable.""' Studies have shown that
men and women differ in their perceptions of what a
reasonable person would find harassing behavior."2 Such a
disparity points to the conclusion that expert testimony can
help fact-finders understand the different ways that men
and women evaluate potentially offensive behavior, or how
a reasonable woman would view the behavior at issue."'
Furthermore, one of the most difficult questions raised
in sexual harassment cases is why a victim did not report
108. See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 803-05; see also John V.
Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation:
The Role of Reliability ofAssessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 300-
01 (1998) (discussing hostile work environment case where expert was
permitted to testify as to how certain stimuli could create a sexually hostile
work environment).
109. See generally Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21 (discussing areas
of consensus among people in what constitutes sexual harassment).
110. See id. at 797-98 (describing "sufficiently severe" as the aspect to which
social science is most likely to contribute in understanding sexual harassment).
111. See Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 374-75 (discussing Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), which allowed
such testimony, and Lipsett v. University of P.R., 759 F. Supp. 40, 44 (D.P.R
1991), which excluded such testimony).
112. See id. at 375-76 (discussing research on how gender affects perceptions
on reasonableness).
113. See id. at 377. The "reasonable woman standard" is the standard against
which most sexual harassment claims are measured: behavior that a
reasonable woman would find creates a hostile work environment will be
considered harassment, "regardless of the intentions or beliefs of the alleged
harasser." Edward T. Ellis & Mona Ross, The Admissibility of Expert Opinion
Testimony About Human Resources Practices, Sexual Stereotyping and Sexual
Behavior in the Workplace, SEO5 ALI-ABA 703, (1999) (describing standard set
out by Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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the harassment earlier.'14 Expert testimony can offer
explanations on why victims often fail to immediately report
the sexual harassment."' Courts have accepted testimony
explaining that victims may not complain because of
concerns about reprisals or loss of privacy."' Similarly, in
examining the relevance of testimony offered by a plaintiff
regarding acquiescence to sex, one court noted that, "social
scientists in particular may be able to show that commonly
accepted explanations for behavior are, when studied more
closely, inaccurate.""' Cultural testimony too can be
important in order to give context to this and other
situations."'
Testimony can also relate to the adequacy of the
employer's sexual harassment policies or response. The
court in Peone v. Mary Walker School District,"9 a sexual
harassment case, specifically noted that "[wihile a time may
come" when jurors do have knowledge of practices and
policies to prevent harassment, "such knowledge is not
within the province of the average juror."'20
Thus, as with employment discrimination, experts can
play and important role in a plaintiffs case in helping to
provide the full story and theory of sexual harassment,
informing both factual issues and legal doctrine. Experts
can provide information that educates the trier of fact
114. See Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him?, supra note 24 at
117, 122 (1995) (discussing social science data behind failure to report).
115. See Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 131-41 (2001)
[hereinafter Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories] (discussing role of
medical and social science evidence in explaining why women subjected to
sexual harassment fail to report).
116. See, e.g., Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir.
1992) (discussing nature of non-consensual relationships in the workplace).
117. Patel v. Himalayan Int'l Inst. of Yoga Sci. and Philosophy of the USA, No.
3:CV-94-1118, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22532, at *47 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1999)
(quoting Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996)).
118. See generally Zimbroff, supra note 23 (arguing for the importance of
examining the cultural context of sexual harassment).
119. No. CS-02-135-RHW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27639 (E.D. Wash. May 27,
2003).
120. Id. at *6.
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regarding various aspects of sexual harassment.12 ' They can
thus be an important link in explaining to a jury why
certain behavior or material is offensive, or how a workplace
becomes sexualized.'22 Judges and juries may be getting it
wrong by simply relying instead on their own particular
ideas of what constitutes sexual harassment. Expert
testimony can help to ameliorate this problem by providing
scientific expertise that fact-finders can utilize in making a
decision rather than simply relying on their own, possibly
faulty, assumptions.'23
B. Exclusion of Expertise for Lack of Reliance /Helpfulness
1. Exclusion. Judges may exclude expert testimony for a
variety of reasons. For instance, they may determine that
the testimony's reliability is cuestionable due to
methodology- a reliability inquiry. 4 Alternatively, the
judge's exclusion may be based on subconscious biases,125 or
reflect his or her devaluation of expert testimony in
women's sex discrimination claims.126
The most far-reaching exclusion of expert testimony,
however, occurs when judges exclude testimony because
121. See generally Shestowsky, supra note 4 (describing how experts can
inform the fact-finder).
122. Id. at 370-71 (describing a case where the expert was able to explain how
certain material could be inoffensive to men but at the same time still offensive
to women (citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.
D. Fla. 1991))); see also id. at 367-70 (discussing expert testimony on "sexual
spill-over" where individuals might regard co-workers of the opposite sex as
sexualized objects rather than simply co-workers).
123. See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 821 ("Social science can
provide these decision-makers with some information where currently they
often rely on their own suppositions about what 'reasonable people' believe").
124. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 99 C 3356, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17543, at *13-14 (excluding expert testimony based on Sexualized Experiences
Questionnaire for lack of reliability). There are five Daubert factors listed- they
are generally not all applicable, so courts will rely on the ones that fit the case.
Courts have discretion to consider other factors as well. Id at *7.
125. See Kanner & Casey, supra note 51, at 307 ("The problem with Daubert is
that it allows judges' subconscious biases and preconceptions to shape their
decision-making in a dramatic way.").
126. See Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 365 (discussing possible bias in federal
courts and rules).
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they see it as irrelevant and not helpful to the trier of fact. 127
Reliability can be remedied,128 but no matter how solid a
conclusion an expert may draw or how reliable his or her
methodology, if the court finds the testimony will not assist
the trier of fact, it will never be admitted. As one court
noted, "[tihe touchstone of Rule 702 is helpfulness of the
expert, a condition that goes primarily to relevance."29
Courts are excluding expert testimony for its lack of
relevance and failure to assist the trier of fact with the
presentation of any specialized knowledge.'30
127. See id. at 357 ("Federal court judges frequently disallow expert testimony
because they assume that what constitutes sexual harassment is 'common
knowledge' and therefore expert opinion on the matter would not be helpful to
the trier of fact."); see also Ellis & Ross, supra note 113, at 709 ("Whether expert
testimony falls outside the realm of common knowledge depends a lot on what
the trial judge thinks is common knowledge."); Hunter, supra note 68, at 142
(discussing an argument that courts impose a higher threshold for admissibility
of expert testimony around issues important to women in comparison to
testimony for "male" issues).
128. See Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and
Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 330 (2002) (noting attorneys report scrutinizing their
experts' credentials more closely); Roisman, supra note 57, at 156-57 (discussing
how parties have adjusted by choosing experts more carefully and submitting
more elaborate reports); see also LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST.
FOR CIV. JUsT., CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xvii
(2001) (concluding based on increase and then decrease in evidence found
unreliable that parties may have approached expert testimony to meet new
standards).
129. Mehus v. Emporia State Univ., 222 F.R.D. 455, 458 (D. Kan. 2004).
130. See, e.g., Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002);
Ofsharick v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., No. 01-CV-3427, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15646, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2003). Such attitudes may date back
even further than Daubert. See Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266,
1271 (9th Cir. 1980) (excluding expert testimony on discrimination because the
question of differential treatment was "not so technical as to require the aid of
an expert to enlighten the jury or court."); see also Matthew Wise, From Price
Waterhouse to Dukes and Beyond, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 569
(2005) (discussing problems with current application of Daubert, including
"regarding as common knowledge specialized knowledge that may offer insights
helpful to the jury").
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As noted above, basic relevance under Rule 401 simply
asks that evidence tend to prove a fact more or less likely.'
The exclusion of any kind of testimony on the basis of
relevance poses questions of perspective, but in the context
of sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases,
relevance presents more problematic issues. First, a judge
must determine whether the expert testimony is relevant at
all; second, whether the testimony will assist the trier of
fact.132 However, as feminist scholars have noted, relevance
is determined by experience, and the experience of one fact-
finder may differ from another.' Relevance, then, should
be evaluated as broadly as possible, to account for the fact
that judges or juries may not have enough knowledge to
accurately determine issues of fact around sex
discrimination or sexual harassment.
Daubert focused on the reliability of expert testimony,
and, as noted above, did not aim to change the standard of
relevance.134 However, as demonstrated below, courts apply
the relevance standard in ways that can lead to exclusion of
expert testimony on relevance grounds in an inconsistent
and concerning way.
2. Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc. and Zhao v. Kaleida
Health. Expert testimony was excluded in two cases that
illustrate the point that exclusion on grounds of relevance
can greatly affect the claim. They show how a judge's view
of the case impacts what testimony is considered relevant as
well as demonstrates how judges make assumptions based
on their own intuitions or interpretation of the legal theory.
The exclusion of expert testimony by the district court
judge in Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc.' shows how a view of
131. Fed. R. Evid. 401; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
132. See Wise, supra note 130, at 553 (discussing Rule 702 and requirement
that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue" (quoting Rule 702)).
133. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28
Sw. U. L. REV. 171, 212 (1999) ("Relevance is thus often 'in the eye of the
beholder.'").
134. See DIXON & GILL, supra note 128, at 61 (noting Daubert did not change
standards for relevance of expert testimony, but that judges appear to be
scrutinizing relevance more closely).
135. 550 F. Supp. 2d 140,143 (D. Me. 2008).
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such testimony as not relevant or helpful can interact with
the judge's view of how discrimination operates. The judge
in Chadwick found that plaintiff Laurie Chadwick did not
have sufficient evidence to get to a jury on whether her
employer "actually engaged in sex-based employment
discrimination by promoting another woman."' 3 6  In
reaching his decision, the judge found that the expert
testimony proffered by Chadwick "would not be helpful to a
fact-finder on the issues that are relevant to this
decision."'37 The finding that the testimony was irrelevant
demonstrates how the judge's understanding of what the
testimony would show was inextricably tied up with a view
of what was legally relevant.
The issue in the case was whether or not an employer's
decision not to promote Laurie Chadwick, the mother of four
young children, was the product of sex stereotyping. The
decision maker, Ms. Miller, told Chadwick that she had too
much on her plate with her kids and would be overwhelmed
and that it was not anything that she did or did not do.13
Additionally, Miller had found out just two months earlier
that Chadwick had young triplets and sent her an email
sayi "Oh my-I did not know you had triplets ... Bless
you.
On the basis of these statements, Chadwick argued that
she was denied the promotion based on the assumption that
"she would not be able to successfully manage her work and
family responsibilities because she is a woman."'40 The
expert that Chadwick offered, Dr. Mary Still, testified that
social science "shows that at least half the people in the
United States continue to believe that women with young
children should not work outside the home." 4' The
stereotype is that women's work will suffer because they are
136. Id. at 142. (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 143
138. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2
Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 550 F.Supp.2d 140 (D. Me. 2008) (No.07-CV-70-
DBH) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Objection].
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 8.
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the primary caregivers of their children; there is no
corresponding stereotype for men.142
The judge concluded that the expert's testimony would
not assist the trier of fact with regards to sex-based
stereotyping,14 and eventually found that the plaintiff did
not have enough evidence such that a "jury could conclude
that her supervisors considered her care ving role as a
female in their decision not to promote her."
The conclusions drawn by the court demonstrate how
the judge used his own interpretation of the situation rather
than allowing room for possible explanations supported by
the expert. Regarding the statement of "Bless you" made by
Miller upon learning that Chadwick had triplets, the court
asserted that such an exclamation "cannot alone be turned
into a stereotyped remark differentiating mothers of young
children from fathers of young children." 45 As a final
resolution, the court concluded that, "for purposes of legal
analysis, the utterance is a friendly exclamation.""' The
court disregarded the possible explanation offered by the
expert that supported a claim of discrimination. In
particular, the court felt that the testimony was not helpful,
as the expert did not have extensive knowledge about the
particular decision maker,'47 thus balking at the use of
generalized social science knowledge in a particular
situation.
The court made assumptions about how stereotyping
works that limited the framework of how discrimination
was seen to operate in this case. The exclusion of the expert
142. Id.
143. Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 143. ("[T]he expert's testimony would not be
helpful to a factfinder on the issues that are relevant to this decision. . .").
144. Id. at 145 (discussing law applicable to plaintiffs claim and concluding
she does not have enough evidence).
145. Id. at 145. After noting that the jury would be familiar with uses of the
term "[bIless you," court concluded that it would be "improper" for the expert to
testify as to what Miller meant, as Dr. Still was "not familiar with Miller, her
background, or her semantic usage, and who has not even read Miller's
deposition." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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testimony as irrelevant, then, points to the interaction of
legal theories behind sex discrimination with beliefs about
the operation of stereotypes.
The idea that an expert was not needed in this case
surfaces explicitly in the court's assertion that "[wie know
there are stereotypes in our culture about male/female
roles."'48 This statement reinforces the idea that judges and
juries bring certain assumptions with them to the
courtroom. Believing that what they already know is
correct can mean inaccurately interpreting events that
social science has studied and can illuminate. " It speaks to
the problem that courts, as adjudicators in these cases, will
determine what is or is not "known" about stereotypes and
behavior.'" This is not to say that a jury or judge must
credit all that an expert offers; however, such testimony
should be allowed to reach the trier of fact to shed light on
the stereotypes that still pervade the workplace.
After this detailed analysis of the plaintiffs evidence
and refusal to entertain the perspective offered by the
expert, the court concluded that the decision maker's "use of
sexual stereotypes cannot be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence on this record," and granted summary
judgment for the defendants.'
On appeal, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was reversed.'52 However, the exclusion of expert
testimony was upheld.' The disagreement between the
courts centered on the district court's refusal to accept the
148. Id. at 147 (emphasis supplied). For example, in the U.S. men are
perceived as more ambitious than women, and women as more communal than
men. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1408.
149. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 8, at 999 ("Behavioral theories can thus
enter and remain embedded in legal doctrine long after they have been
disconfirmed or superseded by advances in the empirical social sciences.").
150. See R6mkens, supra note 74, at 359 ("Jurisprudence is one important
source of normative definitions of masculinity and femininity, with a profound
impact in society and culture, since decisions . . . will be constitutive for many
subsequent actions of individuals and institutions in society.").
151. Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
152. Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
153. Id.
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statements of the defendants as valid circumstantial
evidence of discrimination.'54 The circuit court, however,
found that a requirement of explicit reference to Chadwick
as a woman would undermine the entire concept of proof by
circumstantial evidence, making it very difficult to prove
any sex discrimination cases."5
While the circuit court recognized that a reasonable jury
could find evidence of sex discrimination, it did not overturn
the district court's exclusion of expert testimony, because it
found no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision."' After
General Electric v. Joiner, another potential problem in
Daubert jurisprudence is that appellate courts may only
overturn findings on expert testimony if the decision was
"manifestly erroneous."' ' The circuit court noted that,
seemingly contrary to the district court's view, expert
witnesses are "permitted wide latitude to offer opinions,
including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge
or observation."'" It thus upheld the district court's
decision but implied that the testimony proffered was not
necessarily of the type that must be excluded,'59 avoiding
any confrontation of the actual issues presented in the
social science testimony.
In addition, despite the recognition that the testimony
need not necessarily be excluded, the court reaffirmed the
notion that expert testimony was not necessary in this
case. 60 It noted that it had reached its decision to reverse
the judgment without the expert's testimony, and in doing
so, cited two other cases for the proposition that it took "no
special training" in either of those sex discrimination cases
154. Id. at 46-47.
155. Id. at 46.
156. Id. at 41.
157. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
158. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 48 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
159. Id. at 49 n.14.
160. Id. at 48-49.
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to discern sex stereotyping.'61 Clearly, however, the district
court and circuit court disagreed as to whether or not
Chadwick had presented sufficient evidence for a
discrimination claim. Such divergent views reaffirm the
necessity of having experts inform judges and fact-finders
about the functioning of sex stereotyping.
An example from the sexual harassment context
similarly demonstrates the interaction of theories of sexual
harassment and social science testimony. In Zhao v.
Kaleida Health,162 the judge refused to hear expert
testimony on why the plaintiff did not report the abuse or
end the relationship. Had such testimony been admitted, it
could have educated the fact-finder as to how sexual
harassment operates, possibly correcting any inaccurate
assumptions.
Shan Zhao, a woman of Chinese origin, filed a complaint
against her employer and supervisor alleging sexual
harassment and discrimination based on gender and
national origin.163 She maintained that she had been
subjected to unwanted advances, touching, conversations of
sexual nature, and sexual assault.164 Her supervisor,
Kopinski, asserted that the relationship was consensual.'65
In its analysis, the court discussed the two types of
sexual harassment a plaintiff can allege: quid pro quo and
hostile work environment.'66 The court focused on the fact
161. Id. at 48 n.12 (citing Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch.
Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) and Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)).
162. Zhao v. Kaleida Health, No. 04-CV-467-JTC, 2008 WL 346205, at *8-9
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008).
163. Complaint at 5-8, Zhao v. Kaleida Health, No. 04-CV-467-JTC, 2008 WL
346205 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008).
164. Id. at 3-5.
165. Answer at 4, Zhao v. Kaleida Health, No. 04-CV-467-JTC, 2008 WL
346205 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008).
166. The court laid out the test for both types. For quid pro quo, a plaintiff
must show that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct and her reaction
was then used as a basis for decisions affecting her employment. Zhao, 2008
WL 346205, at *3 (citing Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 356 (2d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922, 122 (2002)). To prove a hostile work
environment claim, the plaintiff must show that she is a member of a protected
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that under either test, the plaintiff has to prove that she
was subject to unwelcome advances.'67 The court then
proceeded to note that its analysis must be conducted in
light of the totality of circumstances, but focused only on a
selection of emails between Zhao and Kopinski.'" The court
found that "the record cannot reasonably support a finding
that defendant Kopinski's advances were 'unwelcome' by
plaintiff."' The magistrate then recommended that Zhao's
sexual harassment claim be dismissed on summary
judgment.o
Zhao offered the testimony of a forensic psychologist,
Dr. Ewing, to support her claims with testimony as to why
she did not report the alleged abuse or end the relationship,
and also the harm that she suffered. 7' The court, citing
Daubert for its twin prongs of reliability and relevance,
found that "[b]y definition," such testimony "cannot possibly
be relevant" to the issue of unwelcome advances.'72
group, was subject to unwelcome advances because of her sex, and that the
harassment affected her employment. Id. at *3 (citing Cosgrove v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1993)).
167. Id. at *3-4 ("Thus, in order to prevail under either test, plaintiff must
prove that defendant Kopinski's conduct was 'unwelcome.'").
168. Id. at *4-7 (detailing e-mails between Zhao and Kopinski).
169. Id. at *10.
170. Id. As with Chadwick, it is a magistrate's recommendation that is being
adopted by the district court judge.
171. Id. at *8.
172. Id. The court also concluded that even if relevant, his testimony would be
unreliable, as he did not review enough of the evidence, and was not competent
to testify as an expert on abuse of Chinese women. Id. at *8-9. The court
additionally rejected the testimony on the basis that it was a credibility
determination of the plaintiff. Id. at *9 (noting expert opinions evaluating
witness credibility are inadmissible under Rule 702). While this conclusion is
consistent with general evidentiary principles, biases against granting
credibility to women plaintiffs in general may be present, and while this article
does not advocate here a change in the present refusal to allow credibility
testimony, this issue warrants closer attention. See Schneider, supra note 5, at
711 (discussing how difficulties women face in judicial evaluations of their
credibility can also contribute to summary judgment).
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Courts may often come to different conclusions from a
jury with regards to what constitutes sexual harassment.'
There is some consensus about what people see as
harassment, which may differ from what judges consider to
be harassment. Expert testimony can inform the litigation,
for instance by explaining what kind of behavior can rise to
the level of sexual harassment,'74 which may be clear to
some fact-finders, but cannot be said to amount to common
knowledge.
By disregarding the relevance of the expert testimony
proffer by Zhao, the judge imposed a view of how the
mechanisms of sexual harassment operate. In doing so, the
court negated the full story of her experience, picking and
choosing only those issues it deemed relevant, and
excluding any information that it conceived as being unable
to support the already chosen theory.'75
III. A RETURN TO RULES: A BROADER CONTEXT
A. The Role of the Expert
Courts need expert testimony in order to understand
what they do not know or recognize-for example, how
subtle stereotyping operates, or the presence of
discrimination that at first glance does not appear to be
present.' Expert testimony can aid in addressing "second
generation"" discrimination and providing necessary
173. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21, at 796 ("[Plerceptions of
judges on what constitutes harassment to the reasonable person do not always
square with what the reasonable person perceives as harassing.").
174. Id. at 797-98; see also id. at 809 ("One of the most common rhetorical
strategies lower courts use to dispose of sexual harassment cases is simply to
declare that no reasonable person could find the behavior sufficiently severe or
pervasive.").
175. See id. at 828 (noting that courts will often pick apart incidents of
harassment and then conclude that each individual one does not, as a matter of
law, meet the legal definition of sexual harassment).
176. See Hart & Secunda, supra note 9 (discussing importance of expert
testimony, particularly at class certification stage).
177. See Bielby & Coukos, Statistical Dueling, supra note 70, at 1570
(discussing modern class action suits combating "second generation"
discrimination). See generally Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 84.
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frameworks for new understandings about the operation of
discrimination. Additionally, it can help judges understand
any consensus that does exist about sexual harassment,"'
such as agreement that certain kinds of jokes or actions
constitute harassing behavior."'
Expert testimony can bring social science into the
courtroom in ways that will inform current theories and
help to push the law in new directions that will help it
reflect the realities of how sex discrimination and sexual
harassment operate in society.
For instance, social science can be applied to both
disparate treatment and disparate impact types of claims.'s
The ways in which discrimination cases operate today is
quite different from the "smoking gun" cases of the past.''
Expert testimony can explain to fact-finders the ways in
which it is now understood that discrimination still operates
in the workplace.'82 It can also inform the law about the
operation of sexual harassment. By remaining open to more
accurate social science that is recent and developed, judges
can aid themselves and juries in understanding how
discrimination operates in the present day. This
understanding, in turn, can provide the law with the basis
178. See generally Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 21 (discussing how
juries' views of sexual harassment differ from judges).
179. Id. at 834 (discussing studies showing that while there is less consensus
on these "ambiguous behaviors," than other, clearer forms of sexual harassment,
well over 50% of those surveyed did conclude that they constituted harassment).
180. See Williams, supra note 14 (discussing cases of disparate treatment and
disparate impact under Title VII). Williams also discusses the obsolete nature
of the idea of conscious discrimination, noting that the "self-conscious aversion
model" is "severely out of date." Id. at 293; see also Green, supra note 20.
181. See Bielby & Coukos, Statistical Dueling, supra note 70, at 1581
(discussing how courts have noted the nature of discrimination in today's
workplace as less overt, and thus requiring more inferential proof).
182. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1399 (arguing that expert testimony can
help fact finders to understand the "complex realities of cognition and behavior"
underlying the legal doctrine of discrimination, and that fact finders "can use all
of the help they can get").
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and rationale to push legal theories to match our
understanding of social science."'
Expert testimony will help in continuing to validate
claims that may seem easy. For instance, in her discussion
of Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company Inc., Dianne
Avery argues that "[alfter Price Waterhouse, it should not
take an expert to determine that Harrah's makeup policy
was based on a sex stereotype."l84 While this may be the
case, such a view creates the danger that fact-finders will
miss important social science information when judges
think that a certain conclusion is common sense. Social
science evidence is necessary because it can aid fact-finders
both in better understanding the mechanisms of cognition
that lead to discrimination, and in establishing a context for
evaluating the merits of a case.'
B. Proposed Approach: A Wider Evidentiary Net
This article suggests a more liberal, holistic approach to
the evaluation of expert testimony under Daubert's
relevance prong, one that will allow for a better
understanding of the issues in sex discrimination and
sexual harassment cases.
1. An Expanded View of Relevance. The admission of
expert testimony hinges on a judge's decision that the
testimony is relevant. A judge's understanding of the social
science is thus intricately related to the theories he or she
uses in deciding Title VII claims based on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment. Testimony that
offers a coherent picture of the behavior and practices in the
workplace has been excluded in some cases because judges
do not recognize its ability to assist the trier of fact under
Daubert.
Like social science itself, law should look to the
narrative of the case in order to more accurately identify
183. See Bielby & Coukos, Statistical Dueling, supra note 70, at 1582-83
(discussing how legal scholars conclude that new legal theories must be
developed to address contemporary forms of discrimination).
184. Avery, supra note 6, at 317.
185. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1399 (describing use of implicit bias
evidence).
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what occurred.' Narratives, in an examination for truth,
"not only tell us what happened but they also explain why it
happened. . . ."187 Listening to expertise that can inform
broader legal narratives will aid courts in developing more
accurate factual determinations. Thus, courts should view
expert testimony with an eye towards a larger picture. This
will allow fact-finders to evaluate the evidence not just
under their own behavioral assumptions, but with a full
range of knowledge and information relating to the issue at
hand.
Along with expanding their view to embrace a more
comprehensive picture of a case, courts need to pay closer
attention to the standard they use in evaluating whether
testimony will assist the trier of fact. Testimony that a
judge considers to be not helpful, juries may actually need
to hear in evaluating a claim, " as it can be a corrective tool
in explainin the mechanisms, for instance, of sex
stereotyping.' Daubert attempted to bring the evaluation
of expert testimony into line with the Federal Rules of
Evidence. As discussed in Part I, not only did Daubert not
intend to heighten the standard for admissibility, but the
thrust of the opinion was mainly addressed to the way in
which methodologies and conclusions are evaluated. Rule
702's requirement that testimony "assist the trier of fact,"
however, has been used to exclude testimony that is both
relevant and critical to plaintiffs' cases.
Courts should remember that Daubert did not intend to
change the relevance requirement.1' When examining
relevance, they should include evidence considered relevant
186. See Robin Stryker, Beyond History vs. Theory: Strategic Narrative and
Sociological Explanation, 24 Soc. RES. & METHODS 304, 308 (asserting that
narrative approaches in sociology help researchers to "get the history right by
broadening the way we conceptualize time both for purposes of explaining
specific events and for constructing general theories").
187. Id. at 305.
188. See Wise, supra note 130, at 570 (noting social science research
demonstrates that the way in which discrimination manifests itself is likely not
common knowledge for jurors).
189. Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 369 (describing how some courts have
admitted testimony that has a corrective function in explaining sex
stereotyping).
190. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing impact of Daubert).
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under Rule 401. If the testimony is relevant, if it assists the
jury by making "the existence of any fact that is of
consequence . . . more probable or less probable,"l9 ' then the
testimony should be admitted under the relevance prong of
Daubert. For example, Zhao's proffered testimony
regarding why she did not end the relationship or report the
abuse was discarded by the judge as irrelevant. However,
given the context of the case and the claim, it was clearly
relevant to Zhao's actions and experiences of harassment.
By denying her the right to present such evidence to the
jury, the court prevented her from including testimony that
could support the existence of the alleged abuse.
This is not to say that all expert testimony is
necessarily correct or should be accepted at face value by
the jury as determinative. Expert testimony offered by a
plaintiff is generally offered as support for the plaintiffs
theory, and as such is simply testimony that the jury is free
to weigh and take into account or to disregard. Jurors may
give expert witnesses great weight, because of their
expertise, but they are also encouraged to determine for
themselves the validity of the opinions. They do not have
that option, however, if the court prevents the testimony
from ever being heard.
2. Value of an Expanded Framework. By evaluating
expert testimony with an eye to a holistic view of a case,judges can identify and utilize the relevance of expert
testimony to the case at hand and to larger legal theories of
sex discrimination and sexual harassment. As an initial
matter, this will result in fewer disposals of cases at
summary judgment, allowing for the airing of more claims
in court. Recognizing the relevance of certain testimony
will also educate the triers of fact as to the social science
behind behavioral theories, allowing them to more
accurately decide cases. In addition, it will encourage Title
VII jurisprudence to keep up with current social science.
Allowing for the inclusion of more testimony will
prevent the dismissal of meritorious cases at the summary
judgment stage. This will have the reinforcing effect of
allowing more social science to enter the courtroom in ways
that can help both fact-finders and the law itself in
191. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
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evaluating sex discrimination and sexual harassment
claims. The silencing of claims at summary judgment has
the effect of particularly stunting claims around gender.'92
Including current social science expertise around gender
will allow plaintiffs to at least get to the next stage of
litigation and present their evidence to a fact-finder.
The use of experts will educate the trier of fact as to
interactions and dynamics that result in sex discrimination
in the workplace. Having a social science framework in
which to evaluate the evidence in the case can help fact-
finders recognize that behaviors that might at first seem
innocuous or irrelevant actually have more salient
meanings with respect to the claim at hand.'93 For instance,
under a reasonable person test, evidence of implicit bias can
help a trier of fact to determine if such bias was a
motivating factor in a certain decision.'94 The use of this
knowledge in court can then help to shape and inform
theories of discrimination" and sexual harassment.
The selection of which science is relevant and which
should be admitted, then, can draw legal attention to
updated social science theory. By expanding their view of
the relevance of social science testimony, judges may admit
testimony about institutional patterns and practices that
produce discrimination, and evidence of the causes and
effects of sexual harassment that are highly relevant both to
individual cases and to how the law addresses harassment
as a general cause of action.
The choice a court makes to exclude testimony based on
relevance means taking a stand as to the applicability of
192. See generally, Schneider, supra note 5 (discussing consequences that
summary judgment has on gender claims in civil litigation).
193. Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1399 ( "Comments or actions that might
otherwise be ambiguous or seem tangential to the dispute might take on greater
meaning or more resonance in light of [proof of implicit bias].").
194. Id. at 1402.
195. See Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1428 ( "Absent a clear statement
from Congress, the reasonable interpretation of Title VII is that it should track
current knowledge about human cognition based on the mind sciences."). See
generally Hart & Secunda, supra note 9 (discussing broad political debate over
implicit bias).
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certain testimony and the merits of the underlying claim.196
For instance, employment discrimination claims can draw
on various theories in legal scholarship, including subtle or
unconscious bias, the related idea of behavior realism, and a
structural approach that focuses on mechanisms in
workplaces aimed to address the problems of bias.' Such
"second generation" claims that are not based on deliberate
and intentional discrimination"' can be supported by expert
testimony drawing on updated social science theory.
An excellent illustration of the importance of this kind
of social science is the case Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
currently under consideration by the United States
Supreme Court.'99 It is a suit brought on behalf of over a
million female Wal-Mart employees alleging discrimination
in pay and promotions.200 The essential legal issue relates
directly to the ability of the plaintiff class to demonstrate
common questions of law or fact in order for the suit to
proceed as a class action.20' In order to do so, the plaintiffs
relied on expert testimony presented by Dr. William T.
Bielby, and the District Court found his testimony
"sufficiently probative to assist the Court in evaluating the
class certification requirements at issue in this case."202
196. See Hunter, supra note 68, at 166 ("To the extent that the rules of
evidence are linked to gendered substantive law, doctrinal reform is another
prerequisite to women being fully heard."); cf Romkens, supra note 74, at 356
(noting that by choosing one science, legal authorities "mask] the normativity of
such a choice with the rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity").
197. Kotkin, supra note 75, at 1442-49 (identifying various approaches to
employment discrimination); see also Wise, supra note 130 (noting awareness of
potential for expert testimony in employment discrimination has encouraged
plaintiffs to use experts to explain subtle and unconscious forms of bias).
198. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 84, at 460 (describing the
functioning of discrimination in the workplace where overt actions are not
present).
199. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (docketed Aug. 25,
2010).
200. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Sociology Issue in Wal-Mart
Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/us/28scotus.html.
201. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/wal-mart-v-dukes.
202. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
2011 71
BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAw & SOCIAL POLICY
Wal-Mart contends his testimony is unreliable under
Daubert,2 03 and some commentators agree that his
testimony goes too far,2" but his ability to testify, even at
the class certification stage, has opened the door for
important legal debate on these issues in employment
discrimination. The Court will decide whether or not the
evidence is enough to certify the class for further
proceedings on the merits.
In addition to providing support for preliminary issues
such as class certification, in reaching the merits of a claim
using expert testimony, courts will create opportunities for
plaintiffs to fill previously insurmountable gaps in the
evidence they could present. For example, a major problem
of proof for plaintiffs has been proving that a non-
discriminatory reason for an action by an employer was a
pre-text for intentional discrimination.205 There are several
ways of proving pretext; the most common is showing that
similarly situated employees with different immutable
characteristics were treated more favorably.206 When courts
require that such a "comparator" does not share any of the
protected categories of the plaintiff,207 such proof may be
almost impossible to offer. Expert testimony, however, can
be one possible way of proving pretext. In this regard, "the
evidentiary net must be cast wide."208 A wider net aims to
remedy the problem that as identities are more specific
individual discrimination grows more difficult to prove.20
Such testimony will only be admitted, however, if judges in
their initial evaluation find it relevant.2 10
203. Id., Brief of Petitioner 30-31.
204. See Liptak, supra note 200.
205. Kotkin, supra note 75, at 1491.
206. Id.
207. Id. (noting some courts take approach that comparator must not fall into
any of the same protected categories as plaintiff (citing Philipsen v. University of
Michigan, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25898 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22,
2007))).
208. Id. at 1497.
209. Id. at 1498 (noting courts only compare across narrow segment of
employer where it is difficult for plaintiff to find appropriate supportive
evidence in realm of comparator, statistics, or anecdotal).
210. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
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Similarly, in the context of sexual harassment and
hostile work environment, social science can give the push
that current legal doctrine may need in order to further
develop. The cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth established an affirmative
defense for employers who could show that they had
policies, education, and procedures designed to combat
harassment in the workplace and that the plaintiff failed to
take advantage of them." However, some argue that there
is in fact no empirical support that suggests such measures
actually reduce harassment and additionally that reporting
using internal procedures is a rare response.2 12 Thus, in
promulgating this defense, "the justices appear to have
presumed a behavioral world that does not in fact exist."2 13
One way to combat this particular problem would be a
change in the law. Expert testimony can encourage such a
change in the broader legal theory, and at the more
individualized level it is also important to allow testimony
that would give the court and jury a context, for example,
for a woman's decision not to report.
Taking special note of the larger story of discrimination
and harassment, judges can situate the testimony as
relevant in ways that they may have previously
disregarded. By opening up the context for relevant expert
testimony in sex discrimination and sexual harassment
cases, judges will guard against their own biases and allow
for general education of the trier of fact regarding relevant
social science. In doing so, courts will cease to use Daubert
and summary judgment as a mechanism by which claims
around gender are shut out before ever reaching the
courtroom itself.
211. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 8, at 1017. The employer must show 1) that
the employer took reasonable care to prevent and correct the sexual
harassment, and 2) that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of procedures in
place to avoid the harm. See id.; see also Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's
Stories, supra note 115, at 119 (discussing Faragher/Ellerth defense).
212. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 8, at 1018.
213. Id.; see also Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories, supra note 115, at
117 (noting the two prong defense set up by Faragher and Ellerth gives lower
courts "the fuel they need to engage in assumptions about the manner in which
victims of harassment 'should' behave" and that such assumptions "all too often
do not reflect reality").
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CONCLUSION
Courts exclude expert testimony on the basis of
relevance in concerning ways, disregarding evidence about
sex discrimination or sexual harassment that is both
relevant and important to plaintiffs and to the law. Courts
need to see where this testimony fits into the larger picture
and recognize that there may be a need for experts even
when they believe that they or the jury have enough
knowledge of the issue at hand. Expert testimony in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment claims is not simply
"icing on the cake," but helpful and relevant evidence that
can further causes of plaintiffs and serve to keep the legal
system up to date on important expertise.
